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Policy Watch
Examining the Justification for
Residential Recycling
Thomas C. Kinnaman
This feature contains short articles on topics that are currently on the agendas
of policymakers, thus illustrating the role of economic analysis in illuminating
current debates. Suggestions for future columns can be sent to C. Eugene Steuerle,
c/o Journal of Economic Perspectives, The Urban Institute, 2100 M Street NW, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20037.
Introduction
Most households in the United States engaged in little or no recycling 20 years
ago. Household waste was deposited in the municipal dump, and any recycling was
organized by charitable organizations looking to earn revenue from sales of old
newspapers and aluminum cans. Today, nearly 8,875 municipalities in the United
States, where roughly 48 percent of the population lives, have implemented curb-
side recycling programs. As a direct result, the portion of all solid waste that is
recycled has increased from just over 10 percent in 1990 to nearly 30 percent in
2000 (Kaufman, Goldstein, Millrath and Themelis, 2004). To encourage participa-
tion in recycling, roughly 4,000 municipalities require households to purchase a
special can, bag, tag or sticker for each unit of garbage presented for collection
(Miranda and Byrum, 1999).
The expansion of recycling grew from two roots. First, Subtitle D of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976 provided federal guide-
lines for the construction, operation and closure of landfills. Old municipal dumps
were soon out of compliance with the new laws and were forced to close. Public
worries over a “crisis” lack of landfill space were fanned by incidents like the 1987
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voyage of the barge Mobro, loaded with New York City garbage, which paraded up
and down the Atlantic seaboard unable to a locate a suitable disposal facility.
Actually, throughout the period between 1988 and 1997, the number of landfills
operating in the United States decreased from over 8,000 to less than 3,000, even
though landfill capacity increased from nine years of available storage space to over
20 years (Kinnaman and Fullerton, 2000b). Nonetheless, many states embraced
recycling as a method to reduce the need for landfill storage and passed new
legislation to encourage or require municipalities to offer recycling services to their
households. In addition, there was general heightening of public consciousness
about the salience of environmental issues in the 1970s and into the 1980s, and
reducing household garbage through recycling was part of that movement.
In response to the new state legislation and changing public attitudes, many
municipal governments initiated curbside recycling programs. Several years of
experience with curbside recycling and unit-based pricing have given economists
ample data to study their effects, costs and benefits. This article summarizes these
findings, which suggest that the benefits of recycling accrue primarily as utility
gained by recycling households, while efficiency gains from unit-based pricing over
the last two decades have been quite small. This evidence also suggests a funda-
mental change in this country’s approach to regulating solid waste quantities.
Specifically, state mandates that require municipalities to implement unit-based
pricing programs and especially curbside recycling programs could be usefully
replaced by disposal taxes levied at the landfill.
Residential Curbside Recycling
Residential curbside recycling has increased over the past two decades
despite the fact that these programs are financially costly. The costs to the
municipality to collect, process and transport recyclable materials exceed by an
average of roughly $3 per household per month the budgetary benefits of
reduced disposal fees and revenue from the sale of recycling materials (Kinnaman,
2000; Aadlan and Caplan, 2005). On a per-ton basis, recycling is roughly twice as
costly as landfill disposal. The costly nature of recycling is easily confirmed by the
budget records of many cities and municipalities, even those that ignore the
opportunity cost of allocating municipally owned resources such as warehouses and
administrative staff to the recycling program. Why, then, do many state govern-
ments require curbside recycling?
Recycling Reduces Reliance on Solid Waste Landfills
The external costs of solid waste disposal in remote landfills are not internal-
ized by garbage-producing municipalities. The external costs of landfills include
the odor, visibility and general disamenities to surrounding neighborhoods, which
could reduce property values. The consensus reached by 13 hedonic pricing studies
is that a home located within one mile of a landfill is worth 5 to 10 percent less than
a comparable home away from a landfill (Defra, 2003). This reduction in property
2 Journal of Economic Perspectives
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values occurs largely during the initial citing and construction of the landfill.
Subsequent owners of these properties internalize the costs by paying less for the
property. Using assumptions about the number of homes located within close
proximity to the landfill, the value of those homes, the quantity of waste deposited
per year at the landfill, and the discount rate, Defra (2004) estimates the disamenity
costs to range between $3.05 and $4.39 per compacted ton (virtually all waste
entering landfills is compacted by collection trucks) disposed over the lifetime of
the landfill.
The external costs of landfill disposal may also include the threat to area
groundwater resulting from a possible breach in the lining along the base of the
landfill. However, federal regulations require that new landfills are designed to
minimize the likelihood of such breaches; landfills are required to collect and treat
what leaches out of the landfill and to monitor the groundwater for decades after
the landfill closes; and landfills are legally responsible for all damages done by
leaking. Thus, the landfill largely internalizes the costs of a possible breach and
charges higher disposal fees (“tipping fees”) as a result.
Landfills emit two greenhouse gasses—carbon dioxide and methane—during
the natural decomposition of the solid waste. This component of external costs can
vary for two reasons. First, some landfills accept only construction and demolition
waste, which do not decompose as rapidly as household waste. Second, some
landfills capture and burn methane for the generation of electricity, which is a
relatively carbon-free form of energy that displaces the use of coal, oil and natural
gas. Davies and Doble (2004) estimate that the external marginal cost attributable
to greenhouse emissions is $3.27 per compacted ton of garbage disposed for
landfills without energy recovery and $2.22 per compacted ton for landfills with
energy recovery. Additional recycling may not reduce these external costs if the
papers, plastics and metals that are recycled would not have contributed much to
greenhouse gas emissions if they had decomposed in a landfill.
The remaining external cost of garbage disposal involves the transportation of
solid waste to the landfill. Transportation of waste could cause congestion, air
pollution and the increased probability of road accidents. Davies and Doble (2004)
estimate these costs to be $0.51 per compacted ton for urban landfills and $1.69 per
compacted ton for rural landfills. These external costs are not necessarily reduced
by additional recycling, since recyclable materials must also be transported.
Based upon the above estimates, the external costs of solid waste transporta-
tion and disposal total between $5.38 and $8.76 per compacted ton. The landfill
internalizes some of these external costs by paying per-ton “host fees” to neighbor-
ing townships and county governments for original permission to site the landfill.
Presumably these host agreements are negotiated to make neighbors no worse off
with the landfill and payment than without them (Jenkins, Maguire and Morgan,
2004). As an example, 26 private landfills in Pennsylvania pay local governments an
average per-ton host fee of $4.05 per ton. Thus, this portion of the external costs
of landfills is internalized by garbage generators. The remaining portion of the
external costs of legal garbage disposal amounts to between $1.33 and $4.71 per
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compacted ton in Pennsylvania. Additional recycling may reduce these external
costs, but at a budgetary cost of $40 to $50 per ton (SWANA, 1995).
Recycling Preserves Natural Resources
The provision of recycled material reduces the demand for natural resources
such as virgin timber and raw minerals. Assuming that markets for recycled material
are sufficiently competitive, the marginal benefit of preserving natural resources
through recycling is equal to the corresponding market price for each recyclable
material and is therefore internalized by municipal recycling programs selling
recyclable materials. Prices for recycled glass, various recycled papers and card-
boards, and the various forms of recycled plastics have historically been near zero.1
Prices for aluminum and bi-metal cans are higher, but the quantity of these
materials recycled by households is rather small. Judging by the price for recycled
materials, the natural resource benefit of recycling is not particularly substantial.
Any external costs created by natural resource extraction or processing that are not
reflected in the price of these materials are not internalized by recyclers. Prices of
recycled materials would need to double or triple from current levels to make the
net benefits of recycling positive (Kinnaman, 2000).
Recycling Provides Utility to Participating Households
Recycling is something parents and children feel good about, and for this
reason households may be willing to pay for recycling opportunities. An expanding
literature employing the contingent valuation method, which uses surveys to esti-
mate valuations, finds that households are willing to pay an average of $5.61 per
month for recycling services (Jakus, Tiller and Park, 1996; Lake, Bateman and
Partiff, 1996; Tiller, Jakus and Park, 1997; Kinnaman, 2000; Aadlan and Caplan,
2005).2 Unlike the sources of external benefits discussed above, these benefits to
households exceed the $3 per household average cost of operating curbside
recycling programs in some (but not all) municipalities.
This utility benefit to households can also be deduced by the appearance of
private firms offering to collect household recyclable materials where municipal
collection services are unavailable. In the 1980s and early 1990s, firms with names
such as Paper Chase and Trash Rehash (both of which operated in Virginia),
shared the market for collecting household recyclables before new municipal
recycling programs offering free collection to households brought the private
industry to an end. Residential customers were paying Paper Chase $12 per month
in the early 1990s for weekly pickup of recyclable materials.
1 I obtained the historical data on prices of recycled material from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
2 The contingent valuation method utilizes surveys that ask households to respond hypothetically to
structured questions designed to elicit a monetary value for a household’s willingness to pay for an
environmental good such as a curbside recycling program. The most reliable studies first describe the
aspects of the environmental good before asking directly, “Would you be willing to pay $X for this
environmental good?” where X varies randomly across responders. A follow-up question increases or
decreases the value of X depending upon the initial response. The Journal of Economic Perspectives devoted
a symposium to the practice and controversies of contingent valuation in the Fall 1994 issue.
4 Journal of Economic Perspectives
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The utility benefit to households is also reflected by the many municipal
recycling programs offering households the collection of recyclable materials for
an added fee. Rates of voluntary participation in these recycling programs are
substantial, even though the programs are costly to participating households (Aad-
lan and Caplan, 2005).
Lessons for Policy
Table 1 summarizes existing estimates of the operating costs and utility ben-
efits to households of curbside recycling programs. Note that the operating costs,
even after subtracting saved disposal fees and revenues from the sale of recyclable
materials, are universally positive. These costs vary between $0.86 per households
per month in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, and $5.10 in Palo Alto, California. The
source of this variation includes the age of the program, the frequency of collec-
tion, the number and types of materials collected, the use of city employees or
contracted private employees, the population density and the local costs of labor
and fuel (Carrol, 1995; Bohm, Folz and Podolsky, 1999). Budgetary benefits such as
saved disposal costs and revenue from the sales of materials also vary across the
country, due to varying land prices and proximity to manufacturing centers.
Disposal costs and prices for recycled materials are typically higher in the northeast
than in other regions of the country.
Utility benefits to participating households also vary across municipalities, due
to differences in tastes for the environment and the opportunity costs of employing
household resources to recycling. Contingent valuation surveys suggest the active-
use benefits to households vary between $7.57 per household per month in Tempe,
Arizona, to as low as $4.06 in Inglewood, California. Clearly the net benefits of
providing a curbside recycling program (the benefits to participating households
minus the operating costs) are not positive for all communities. Thus, curbside
recycling may not be beneficial in all municipalities.
But 22 states require all of their municipalities to establish curbside recycling
programs, as listed in Table 2. For example, Act 101 passed in 1988 in Pennsylvania
requires all municipalities with populations greater than 5,000 to implement curb-
side recycling. The number of recycling programs increased from 141 in 1988 to
709 in 1992. Another 22 states do not mandate curbside recycling, but require all
of their municipalities to meet a recycling target. Some states utilize both measures.
Given the heterogeneity in net benefits across municipalities, these state mandates
may be welfare subtracting.
The False Promise of a Curbside Garbage Tax
When economists like Smith (1972) and Wertz (1976) began to study the
market for solid waste, most municipalities financed solid waste collection services
either with local property taxes or with fixed monthly or quarterly fees. Under these
finance schemes, the cost of contributing one additional bag of garbage to the
household is zero, which suggests households will generate more waste than is
Examining the Justification for Residential Recycling 5
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socially desirable in a world where landfill disposal generates social costs. This
inefficiency could be corrected with a direct tax on household garbage. House-
holds paying the appropriately set unit-based charge internalize all social marginal
costs of their garbage production. In response to this fee, households could reduce
the amount of garbage they generate or divert some materials for recycling. Once
a municipality has established unit-based pricing, no other recycling mandates are
necessary. For these reasons, Repetto, Dower, Jenkins and Geoghegan. (1992),
Miranda, Everett, Blume and Roy (1994) and Porter (1992) advocate a broader role
for unit-based pricing programs.3
Municipalities operate three types of curbside pricing programs in this coun-
try. The first type, often called the bag/tag program, requires households to either
purchase specific garbage bags, or purchase stickers or tags to affix on each of their
3 Setting the appropriate fee for garbage collection can be tricky when there are both fixed and marginal
costs of garbage collection. A curbside price of zero would have low garbage generators partly subsi-
dizing the costs of high garbage generators. This notion may have motivated the implementation of
some unit-based pricing programs. But a curbside price set equal to the average total cost of collection
would have high garbage generators partly subsidizing the fixed costs of low garbage generators. For
example, if the time that a truck idles outside a one-can household and a two-can household is the same,
and the fees are set to cover the total cost of garbage collection, then the two-can household paying twice
that of the one-can household has subsidized a portion of the collection costs of the one-can household.
The municipality could employ a two-part tariff by combining a monthly fee to cover fixed costs and a
unit-based fee to cover marginal costs.
Table 1
The Operating Costs and Utility Benefits of Recycling
Author Municipality
Monthly per
Household
Program Costs
Monthly per Household
Utility Benefit
SWANA (1995) Five U.S. communities $2.00
Jakus, Tiller and Park (1996) Nashville, TN $5.78
Lake, Bateman and Partiff (1996) United Kingdom $4.50
Tiller, Jakus and Park (1997) Nashville, TN $4.05 (non-recyclers)
Tiller, Jakus and Park (1997) Nashville, TN $11.74 (recyclers)
Kinnaman (2000) Lewisburg, PA $0.86 $7.16
Aadlan and Caplan (2005) Tempe, AZ $1.62 $7.57
Longmont, CO $3.03 $7.21
Orem, UT $2.78 $5.75
Wichita, KS $5.16
Fargo, ND $2.68 $4.86
Abilene, TX $4.97
Palo Alto, CA $5.10 $5.03
Olathe, KS $3.58 $4.06
Peoria, AZ $4.81
Escondido, CA $3.16 $4.58
Inglewood, CA $4.06
Newport Beach, CA $3.42 $4.09
Portland, OR $2.89
Seattle, WA $1.71
6 Journal of Economic Perspectives
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Table 2
Current State Policies
State
Require Curbside
Recycling
Required
Recycling Goal
Require
User Fee
Subsidize
User Fee
Promote
User Fee Landfill Tax
Alabama X 25% X
Alaska X
Arizona X
Arkansas X X $2.50/ton
California X 50% X $1.40/ton
Colorado
Connecticut X 25% X $1.00/ton
Delaware X
Florida 30% X
Georgia 25%
Hawaii 50% $0.25/ton
Idaho
Illinois 25% X $2.22/ton
Indiana X $0.50/ton
Iowa 50% X $4.25/ton
Kansas X $1.50/ton
Kentucky X $1.75/ton
Louisiana 25% X
Maine X
Maryland X 20% X
Massachusetts X
Michigan
Minnesota X 35% X $2.00/cubicyard
Mississippi
Missouri X $2.04/ton
Montana X
Nebraska X X $1.25/ton
Nevada X 25% X
New Hampshire
New Jersey X 60% X $8.00/ton
New Mexico X
New York X X
North Carolina 25% X
North Dakota X
Ohio 25% X X $1.75/ton
Oklahoma
Oregon varies $1.24/ton
Pennsylvania X X $6.25/ton
Rhode Island X 15% X
South Carolina 30% X
South Dakota X
Tennessee 25% $ .75/ton
Texas X $1.25/cubicyard
Utah X
Vermont X 40%
Virginia X 25%
Washington X X
West Virginia X $1.55/ton
Wisconsin 35% X $3.00/ton
Wyoming X
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own garbage containers. Only garbage identified with the bag, sticker or tag is
collected. These programs became popular beginning in the late 1980s in small
towns in Pennsylvania and New Jersey and have more recently been implemented
in other regions. The second type of program is a weight-based system initiated in
Seattle, Washington, and in some European cities. Garbage trucks are fitted with
scales, and collectors weigh each household’s garbage and bill that household
accordingly. These weight-based systems eliminate the incentive for households to
reduce garbage collection expenses by compacting waste into fewer containers. The
“Seattle Stomp,” as it became known in the literature, is not particularly helpful
since most garbage trucks compact household waste anyway. The third type of
curbside pricing program is often called a subscription or can program. Residents
in these municipalities pre-subscribe to a specific number of cans or to a specific
size of can and are billed according to this quantity whether or not the household
utilizes the subscribed capacity. These programs have operated for several decades
in many municipalities in California, Oregon and Washington. (Some municipal-
ities prefer to issue specific garbage containers of a single size to beautify alleys and
driveways and to streamline the process of garbage collection.). The incentive, on
the margin, for a household to reduce waste is not as strong with a subscription
program as with the other two programs because households generating, say, 1.5
cans of garbage each week would normally contract for 2 cans per week and will
thereafter face a zero marginal cost for up to 0.5 cans of additional garbage each
week.
The Effect of Unit-Based Pricing
Table 3 summarizes the results of studies that have estimated the change in
disposal behavior by households facing unit-based pricing programs. These studies
consistently estimate the demand for garbage collection services to be inelastic.
Two studies have examined the effects of weight pricing, and both estimated
changes in disposal behavior are roughly equal to those of the bag/tag studies. For
the subscription programs, studies based on the experience in Marietta, Georgia,
show a moderate effect, but most studies show little or no significant effect.
It takes a special kind of household to respond substantially to the implemen-
tation of a user fee. Because virtually all municipalities charging user fees had
already established a curbside recycling program, many households were already
recycling before the user fee was implemented. The most environmentally friendly
households were likely to recycle the most, and would therefore find it difficult to
reduce waste substantially further following the implementation of a unit-based
pricing program. Households comprised of busy professionals or retirees may face
high costs to separate and store recyclable material and would simply pay the
per-bag charge without engaging in any additional recycling. To change disposal
practices substantially, a household must (1) recycle little prior to the user fee and
(2) face low costs to recycle such that the per-bag fee would tip the margin towards
recycling. That unit-pricing programs generally fail to produce much change in
disposal behavior suggests that the number of such households is small.
8 Journal of Economic Perspectives
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Some caution should be taken before comparing the elasticities across empir-
ical studies. Some studies use household-level observations before and after the
implementation of a curbside charge, and estimate an arc-elasticity. Other studies
utilize a cross-section of municipality-level data and derive point elasticities using
the mean price and garbage quantity, which can vary across data sets. To provide
a sharper comparison across empirical studies, the absolute change in garbage
generation attributable to a $1 curbside user charge is also reported in the final
column of Table 3, as a way of controlling for the varying methodologies used to
estimate price elasticities. All of these studies estimated the slope of a linear
demand curve for garbage collection, which are reported in Table 3 after normal-
Table 3
Estimates of the Incidence of Bag/Tag Programs
Authors Data Program Type
Price
Elasticity
of
Demand
Pounds of Garbage
Reduction per $1
User Fee (per
household per week)
Fullerton and
Kinnaman
(1996)
Two-period panel of 75
households in Charlottesville,
VA
Bag/Tag 0.08 1.92
Podolsky and
Spiegel (1998)
Cross-section of 159 New Jersey
municipalities
Bag/Tag 0.39 9.83
Van Houtven and
Morris (1999)
39-month panel of 16 sanitation
routes in Marietta, GA
Bag/Tag 0.15 14.28
Van Houtven and
Morris (1999)
Monthly panel of households in
Marietta, GA
Bag/Tag 0.10 11.35
Hong (1999) Cross-section of 3,017
households in 20 South
Korean municipalities
Bag/Tag 0.15
Kinnaman and
Fullerton
(2000a)
Cross-section of 959 towns
across the U.S., 114 with unit-
pricing
Bag/Tag 0.28 7.93
Dijkgraaf and
Gradus (2004)
Three-year panel of 538 Dutch
municipalities
Bag/Tag 0.43 22.66
Linderhof et al.
(2001)
Cross-section of 3,459
households
Weight 1.10 5.60
Dijkgraaf and
Gradus (2004)
Three-year panel of 538 Dutch
municipalities
Weight 0.47 22.89
Van Houtven and
Morris (1999)
39-month panel of 16 sanitation
routes in Marietta, GA
Subscription 0.26 4.60
Van Houtven and
Morris (1999)
Monthly panel of households in
Marietta, GA
Subscription 0.26 10.56
Hong and Adams
(1999)
Panel of 994 households in the
Portland metro area
Subscription 0.01 0.15
Kinnaman and
Fullerton
(2000a)
Cross-section of 959 towns
across the U.S., 114 with unit-
pricing
Subscription 0.01 0.44
Dijkgraaf and
Gradus (2004)
Three-year panel of 538 Dutch
municipalities
Subscription 0.06 0.74
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izing the units of measurement to pounds per households per week. Thus, a $1 per
bag or tag fee reduces household garbage by between 1.92 and 22.89 pounds per
week (for perspective, the average household generates about 30 pounds of gar-
bage per week).
Two clear outliers in this group are estimated by Dijkgraaf and Gradus
(2004), who use a cross section of 538 municipalities in the Netherlands, 126 of
whom have implemented unit-pricing. Unlike every other study in Table 3, this
estimate does not control for the presence of a curbside recycling program in
each municipality, which is often highly correlated with presence of a unit-
pricing program. Thus, the high coefficient may be picking up the aggregate
effect of both programs. Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000a) find a curbside
recycling program increases recycling by 8.78 pounds per household per week.
Crudely subtracting this amount from the Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2004) estimate
provides a household response to garbage pricing that is more in line with the
rest of the literature.
The Net Benefits of Unit-Based Pricing
The net benefits of implementing a pricing program can be estimated using
parameters from a variety of published results. Assume private marginal costs
are $40.00 per ton for garbage collection and $40.00 per ton for garbage
disposal (Repetto, Dower, Jenkins and Geoghean, 1992). Assume the external
marginal cost of garbage collection and disposal is $5.00 per ton (as estimated
above, roughly). Thus, the (assumed constant) social marginal cost of garbage
collection and disposal, and therefore the efficient curbside price, is roughly
$85.00 per ton, or 85 cents per twenty-pound bag. Assume the demand curve for
municipal garbage collection is linear and its slope is determined by the
empirical estimates given in Table 3 (such that the average household reduces
garbage by 12 pounds, or 0.6 twenty-pound bags per week in response to a fee
of $1.00 per bag; roughly the mean of the six published results for bag/tag
programs given in Table 3). Based on these assumptions, increasing the curb-
side price of garbage from zero to 85 cents eliminates a dead weight loss of 25.5
cents per household per week, or $13.26 per year. (The area of the dead-weight
loss triangle is 0.6 bags times $0.85 per bag divided by 2.) Thus, the total
benefits of charging the right price at the curb are sufficient to perhaps pay for
one lunch per household per year.
But before each household can enjoy that cost-offset free lunch, the costs
to implement and administer the unit-based curbside pricing program must be
deducted from the benefits. These administrative costs have been largely ig-
nored by economists. To administer the bag/tag program, bags or stickers need
to be produced and distributed to all households. Garbage collectors need to
examine each container of garbage. Administrators need to monitor the inven-
tories of bags, tags or stickers and answer questions from households and the
retail distributors of the bags, tags or stickers. The municipality must also deter
10 Journal of Economic Perspectives
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and possibly remove any illegally dumped garbage.4 The only two formal
estimates of these administrative costs are by VROM (1997), which uses data
from twelve Dutch municipalities to estimate the bag/tag program costs at
$10.22 per household per year and Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996), who use
data from a single municipality to estimate the program costs at $12.05 per
household per year. Subtracting these costs from the total benefits leaves very
low net benefits of just a few dollars per household per year. If costs to deter or
remove illegally dumped garbage were included, net benefits could be negative.
Weight-based systems are much more costly than bag/tag programs to admin-
ister because scales must be installed on all collection trucks and labor costs
increase as workers weigh each garbage container separately. Furthermore, and as
summarized in Table 3, weight-based systems induce households to reduce garbage
by about the same magnitude as bag/tag programs. Perhaps for these two reasons,
weight-based programs are far less common than bag/tag programs, even though
they discourage households from engaging in the “Seattle Stomp” as a method to
reduce garbage bills.
To administer the subscription programs, the municipality must provide each
household with a certain number of specific-sized containers and bill them accord-
ingly. The municipality must also keep an adequate inventory of various sized cans
as households change occupants or family size and thus their subscription. The
Netherlands Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment estimates
that the administrative costs of operating a municipal subscription program are
$13.81 per household per year—again, roughly the same size as the benefits
(VROM, 1997).
Lessons from the Private Sector
Some municipalities relegate garbage collection services to the free market,
where households contract independently for garbage collection services. These
private collectors apparently agree that the benefits of unit-based pricing for
garbage are small, because they almost universally provide unlimited access to their
collection services for a single fixed price. Private collectors (as well as virtually
every municipal collector) often apply a per-unit curbside fee for the collection of
bulky items such as old mattresses, old stoves, refrigerators and washing machines.
In these cases, the cost of measuring whether a household must pay the extra cost
is low (simply counting either zero or one of these items in almost all cases) and the
variance across households in the cost of collecting and disposing of these items is
4 The possibility of increased illegal dumping is often mentioned as a cost of implementing a unit-based
pricing program. Communities with easy opportunities for dumping, such as those with dense inner-
cities or with unpopulated rural roads, have rarely adopted unit-pricing perhaps to avoid the problems
associated with dumped garbage. Most unit-based pricing programs have been implemented in subur-
ban areas or in small towns where per-capita income levels are high and few convenient dumping sites
exist. Data on illegal dumping from these self-selected communities are not readily available. But
Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) use household questionnaires and observed garbage quantities to
estimate that 38 percent of the reduction in waste attributable to unit-pricing may have been dumped
in Charlottesville, Virginia.
Thomas C. Kinnaman 11
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high. (The costs are zero for most households and rather high for the few
households presenting one of these items). Thus, from a general business perspec-
tive, per-unit curbside pricing programs appear to make sense for occasionally
bulky items, but in most cases not for ordinary weekly garbage collection.5
That 4,000 municipalities have implemented curbside user charges suggests
they are either uninformed or have adopted unit-based pricing to serve some goal
other than reducing quantities of garbage. In fact, municipalities in California,
Oregon and Washington were using the subscription method to finance the costs
of garbage collection long before concerns over excess garbage arose in the 1980s.
Other municipalities have had no choice but to implement unit-based curbside
pricing programs. The states of Washington and Minnesota require the adoption of
these programs (as listed in Table 2). Wisconsin and Iowa also require them, but
only if a municipality has not reached a mandated recycling goal. Several states
provide financial incentives for adopting unit-pricing programs.6
Updating Policy Prescriptions
Many states andmunicipalities have adopted curbside recycling to reduce garbage
totals. With the considerable heterogeneity across municipalities in the costs and
benefits of curbside recycling, the state mandates calling for these programs likely
subtract from welfare in many municipalities. Replacing these state regulations with
unit-based charges for garbage collection would result in small benefits, at best.
The facts and analysis in this article argue for the elimination of state mandatory
recycling and state unit-pricing laws. But regulatory control should not be returned to
individual municipalities until the external costs of their disposed garbage are fully
internalized. The easiest way to internalize these costs is with a rather modest landfill
tax set equal to the external marginal cost of solid waste disposal ($5.38 to $8.76 per
tons estimated above, and reduced by any “host fees” already paid to the local area by
the landfill). This tax would be inexpensive to administer and unlikely to cause illegal
dumping. (It may be harder for municipal and private garbage collectors to avoid the
tax by dumping, as some individual households will do.) Recall that municipal recy-
cling also reduces the demand for raw materials. This benefit of recycling is internal-
ized by the recycling municipality through market prices for recycled materials, assum-
ing firms extracting raw materials internalize all of their own costs. If the extraction of
raw materials generates external costs, then appropriate regulatory measures are
necessary within that industry.
The last column of Table 2 provides a list of the 20 states that currently levee
a landfill tax. New Jersey has implemented the largest tax of $8.00 per ton followed
5 Private waste collectors also apply a lower cost version of the subscription program. Households using
these private collectors subscribe for a specific number of cans but use their own containers.
6 The central government of South Korea in 1995 also made unit-based pricing programs mandatory in
1995 throughout the country, though municipalities can choose their own curbside price. Hong (1999)
studies this program.
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by Pennsylvania with a tax of $6.25 per ton. Other states have implemented landfill
taxes in the $1.00 to $2.00 range. Based on a casual review of the relevant state laws,
these taxes seem to have been implemented, not to ensure that municipalities
internalize disposal costs, but to obtain revenue to provide grants to municipalities
to finance the costs of curbside recycling programs and other environmental
improvement projects.7
In some cases, landfill disposal fees will cause cities to adopt curbside recycling.
Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000a) find that a $1.00 increase in the tipping fee
increases by 0.78 percent the likelihood a municipality chooses to adopt a curbside
recycling program, and by 3.5 cents the optimal price per bag to charge at the curb.
Tawil (1995) also finds that economic variables increase the likelihood that a
municipality will adopt curbside recycling, but Kinnaman (2005) finds no relation-
ship between tipping fees and a municipality’s decision to adopt curbside recycling.
But because both the operating costs and benefits to households of curbside
recycling programs vary across municipalities, local policy decisions should also
vary. If the external costs of garbage disposal were to be internalized through the
landfill tax, state mandates that require municipalities to adopt curbside recycling,
to achieve a recycling target, or to implement unit-based fees for garbage pick-up
would be unnecessary and could be eliminated.
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